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PART I  State Borders: Creation, Consolidation and Challenges
Old Habits, New Realities: Central Asia and Russia 
from the Break-up of the USSR to 9/11
Jeremy Smith
In the years immediately following the break-up of the USSR, the five new 
states of Central Asia were the subject of a number of conflicting assump-
tions and expectations. On the one hand, Russian policy-makers and most 
Western analysts expected the Central Asian states to remain firmly within 
the Russian orbit. On the other hand, many commentators expected the re-
gion to be one dominated by internal conflicts. Ethnic violence in Osh and 
the surrounding regions of Kyrgyzstan, civil war in Tajikistan, and the con-
solidation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to the south appeared to con-
firm the more pessimistic scenarios early on. However, as Neil Robinson has 
persuasively argued, Central Asia overall has confounded the conflict models 
forecast by political science and IR studies.1 In particular, the theory of 
“democratic peace” and its subsequent refinement, Mansfield and Snyder’s 
theory that states in transition to democracy are more prone to both internal 
violence and cross-border warfare than either stable democracies or stable 
authoritarian regimes,2 suggested that Central Asia and Russia would be 
more prone to conflict than has been the case. 
All five Central Asian states have, to a greater or lesser degree, displayed 
many of the attributes of a “failed state,” associated in political science litera-
ture with a high potential for collapse and violence. The geographical group-
ing of the five Central Asian states with Afghanistan and Pakistan, part of 
what Zbigniew Brzezinski dubbed the “arc of crisis,” has exaggerated expec-
tations of crisis including warfare. But in spite of a number of internal con-
flicts, to date there has been no international war involving a Central Asian 
state, and only the occasional distant threat of war. Russian expectations have 
been equally disappointed. Each Central Asian state has developed its own 
                                                          
1 Neil Robinson, “Why not more conflict in the former USSR? Russia and Central Asia as a 
zone of relative peace,” in Conflict in the Former USSR, ed. Matthew Sussex (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 118–145.
2 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go 
to War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
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multivector foreign and trade policy, in which China and Europe figure al-
most as heavily as Russia, with the United States not far behind. Kazakhstan 
led the way in this multivector approach, with Turkmenistan going it alone 
with its official policy of “neutrality.” Predictions made in the early 1990s 
about Central Asia tended to be different from those made about Russia and 
Eastern Europe––but the empirical fact is that assumptions of instability and 
drift back to some kind of reincarnated USSR for the former were just as 
inaccurate as assumptions of a smooth transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy were for the latter.
Robinson’s analysis suggests that at least part of the reason for this is 
that the preoccupation with regime-building rather than state-building in 
Central Asia, while weakening state capacity, discouraged leaders from en-
gaging in the kind of nationalist rhetoric and claims arising from border in-
consistencies which might have led to wars which they were ill-equipped to 
engage in. At the same time, the capture by the regime of what resources 
there were allowed them, to a certain extent, to buy off potential regional foci 
of opposition, albeit not to the same extent as Boris Yeltsin did in the Rus-
sian Federation.
Closer examination suggests, however, that the Central Asian states did 
engage vigorously in the types of state-building activities which Mansfield 
and Snyder identify with the cause of conflict between democratizing re-
gimes. A number of the disputes of the 1990s were between the Central 
Asian states themselves, but disputes between individual Central Asian states 
and Russia were more common overall. The classic ingredients for conflict 
between democratizing states as identified by Mansfield and Snyder––weak 
institutions, pursuit of parochial interests, populism resulting from regime 
insecurity, and ethno-nationalism––were all present not just in the Central 
Asian states but in Russia itself.3 Countervailing factors such as the familiari-
ty of the post-Soviet leaders with each other, engagement in internal conflicts 
(Tajikistan, Chechnya), and more pressing external ones (Transnistria, Na-
gorno Karabakh, Afghanistan) and the clear military superiority of one party 
(Russia), as well as the characteristics identified by Robinson, were at play. 
But for most Western commentators and observers, it was the general passiv-
ity of the Central Asian states, the preoccupation of regimes with internal 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 60–65.
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political struggles, and the readiness to follow Russia’s lead that account for 
the absence of overt conflict.4
The record of events as examined in this chapter, however, suggests that 
even before the end of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states were far 
from passive in accepting the shape of the post-Soviet space. Kazakhstan and 
its president Nursultan Nazarbayev were particularly important in negotiating 
the form of the break-up of the Soviet Union and in promoting Eurasian uni-
ty after it. And all five Central Asian states were not afraid to pursue their 
particular interests. Disputes arose frequently over three main areas: Borders, 
collective security arrangements, and the position of ethnic Russians and oth-
er ethnic issues. Borders and ethnic politics were frequently issues between 
Central Asian states, for example Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but here it is 
disputes with Russia that is the main focus. One feature that should be point-
ed out immediately is that in at least one way, these disputes with Russia did 
impact on relations between the Central Asian states themselves: not only did 
the five states fail to form any common general or specific strategies in op-
posing Russia, but on each issue a different constellation of states could be 
seen aligning themselves for and against the Russian position.
Borders: Free Trade vs. National Security
Although the Central Asian republics are generally viewed as having played 
a passive role in the events culminating in the break-up of the USSR, their 
leaderships were not unaware of the direction of developments. During the 
summer of 1990 the leaders of the Central Asian republics excluding the Ta-
jik SSR reached an agreement that Central Asia was a single cultural unit, 
but that the existing political arrangement into five entities would remain in 
place, and they pledged not to challenge any of the existing borders.5 This 
agreement signaled the readiness of the leaders to hold the USSR together 
while preserving their own privileged political status in each of the republics, 
                                                          
4 For a typical view of the passivity of the Central Asian republics in 1991, see Dmitri Tren-
in, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2011), 25–26: “Central Asia’s five republics…did not secede from the Soviet Union. 
It was the Union that imploded and abandoned them.”
5 Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence (Boulder: 
Westview, 1997).
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thus countering the aspirations of the emerging pan-Turkestani movement to 
create a unified political entity. Kazakhstan’s president Nazarbayev con-
firmed this stance at a press conference at the time of the March 1991 refer-
endum on the preservation of the Soviet Union––Nazarbayev declared Ka-
zakhstan’s full support for a continuation of the Union on the basis of a new 
agreement between sovereign states.6 This is not to say that Central Asian 
leaders behaved as if it was “business as usual” as far as the USSR was con-
cerned. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were using the opportuni-
ty to increase their own authority and freedom from Moscow. Uzbekistan’s 
President Islam Karimov justified the concentration of power in his own 
hands with the argument that “the transition period and the explosive situa-
tion that has developed in the country and here in our republic demand it.”7
These sentiments were regularly echoed by Nazarbayev who, like Karimov, 
had already succeeded in combining the posts of President and leader of the 
Republican Communist Party, as had Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov, 
thereby providing an unprecedented basis for personal power. 
During the remainder of 1991, Nazarbayev was especially active in sup-
porting Gorbachev’s project to keep the USSR together. But his proposals 
went further than Gorbachev’s in seeing the future Union as one between 
sovereign entities, which would have strengthened self-rule in the republics 
while reinforcing existing economic and security relations. Even after the 
failed August coup in Moscow Nazarbayev was the leading initiator of an 
effort to secure an economic agreement between the Soviet Republics,8 and 
he maintained his support for a new Union Agreement as late as December 6,
1991.9
Nazarbayev was not a mere observer in this process, he was actively 
seeking to not only preserve some kind of union, but to shape it to his repub-
lic’s own advantage, securing greater rights but also a coordinated economic 
system which he saw as absolutely necessary for the future prosperity of all 
of the republics. At the same time as supporting Gorbachev’s project, how-
ever, Nazarbayev hedged his bets by paying careful attention to relations 
                                                          
6 E. Matskevich, “Nakanune referenduma,” Izvestiia, March 13, 1991.
7 M. Berger, “Do vsego dolzhny doiti sami. Beseda s prezidentom Uzbekistana Islamom 
Karimovym,” Izvestiia, January 28, 1991.
8 V. Ardaev and E. Matskevich, “Itogi vstrechi v stolitse Kazakhstana prevzoshli vse 
ozhidaniia,” Izvestiia, October 2, 1991.
9 Iu. Orlik, “V Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane k obrashcheniiu Gorbacheva otneslis’ s ponima-
niem,” Izvestiia, December 6, 1991.
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with the RSFSR and its President Boris Yeltsin. Part of his strategy was to 
act as an intermediary who “…tried very actively to intervene, to bring their
(Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s) positions closer together,”10 in order to increase 
the chances of the preservation of the Union. But he also worked to develop 
bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia. Nazarbayev and Yeltsin 
met in Almaty on August 16–17, 1991, just two days before the coup began. 
Following this meeting they issued a joint statement of cooperation which 
included an early commitment to the principle of territorial integrity: 
“preservation of the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan and the Russian Fed-
eration is the most important guarantee for preventing disintegration of the 
country and its component states.”11 Thus the establishment of bilateral ties 
between republics was regarded as a means of preserving the Union, but at 
the same time Nazarbayev came under criticism for such independent ac-
tions. As he argued in an April 1991 interview: “The centre does not like our 
bilateral ties, although strengthening them is nothing more than an endeavor 
to protect the republics’ economies at a time when the management mecha-
nism is falling apart…I am deeply convinced that we can not get along with-
out a Union, and our agreements are a real foundation for a Union Treaty.”12
Nazarbayev was not alone among Central Asia’s leaders in developing 
bilateral ties. The Central Asian republics made a series of agreements with 
each other, such as the establishment in August 1991 of an Interrepublic 
Consultative Council aimed at integrating the five economies.13 They also 
individually concluded agreements with other Soviet Republics. In April 
1991, Kyrgyzstan agreed a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with 
Ukraine which, along with economic and political provisions, included a 
commitment by Ukraine’s leader Leonid Kravchuk for Ukraine to represent 
Kyrgyzstan through its seat at the United Nations.14 At a symbolic level, the 
move to be represented at the UN by another republic (Belarus was the sec-
ond republic to have its own UN representation), rather than through the So-
                                                          
10 Valery Simonov and Yevgenia Dotsuk, “Odin iz ‘nekotorykh, kto prel’stilsia zapadnymi 
ideiami’. Nashi korrespondenty beseduiut s Prezidentom Kazakhskoi SSR Nursultanom 
Nazarbaevym,” Komsomol’skaia Pravda, April 13, 1991.
11 Vera Kuznetsova, “Rossiia i Kazakhstan: vstrecha v verkhakh nakanune podpisaniia soiuz-
nogo dogovora,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, August 17, 1991.
12 Simonov and Dotsuk, “Odin iz ‘nekotorykh, kto prel’stilsia zapadnymi ideiami’.”
13 “Tashkentskaia vstrecha zavershena,” Izvestiia, August 15, 1991.
14 Aleksandr Riabushkin, “Interesy Kyrgyzstana v OON predstavliaet Ukraina,” Izvestiia, 
April 5, 1991.
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viet Union’s delegation, demonstrated a clear willingness to move away from 
the Soviet Union’s orbit. Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev also signed a treaty 
with Yeltsin in July, providing for an 8 million ruble Russian loan and fixed 
prices for raw materials. In spite of protestations that bilateral ties could go 
hand in hand with the renewal of the Union, such moves were widely criti-
cized as preparing the ground for the break-up of the Soviet Union. In partic-
ular, four of the Central Asian republics (Turkmenistan was not included) 
were among the prime movers behind a meeting of twelve of the Soviet Un-
ion’s fifteen republics which met in Moscow in May the day after a meeting 
to discuss the new Union Treaty, to agree alternative plans for economic and 
foreign relations on a multilateral basis for 1992. Thus most of the Central 
Asian republics were preparing for a possibility of the dissolution of the So-
viet Union throughout 1991, at the same time as supporting a new Union 
Treaty to stave off this eventuality. 
Establishing the principle of territorial integrity and fending off any pos-
sible claims for border adjustments from Russia was a key aim of Nazarba-
yev’s at his meeting with Yeltsin on August 16–17. But it soon became clear 
that Yeltsin did not share this commitment. At the Almaty meeting Yeltsin 
declared unequivocally that “there can be no question of our tolerating the 
seizing of any territory of Kazakhstan in favor of Russia.” However, rela-
tions deteriorated dramatically following the failure of the coup and an ap-
parent suggestion by Yeltsin that the borders between the republics may need 
to be revised. A statement signed by Yeltsin’s press secretary Pavel 
Voshchanov stated: “The Russian Federation does not question the constitu-
tional right of every state and people to self-determination. However, there is
a problem of borders, a problem that can and may remain unsettled only giv-
en the existence of relations of union, codified in an appropriate treaty. If 
these relations are broken off [in other words, if the USSR ceases to exist––
JS], the RSFSR reserves the right to raise the question of reviewing its bor-
ders.”15 This prompted Nazarbayev to brand Yeltsin a “great power chauvin-
ist” and to condemn his undemocratic insistence on naming his own appoin-
tees to top government posts.16 However, on August 29 Nazarbayev moved 
                                                          
15 Statement by the Press Secretary of the President of the Russian SFSR P. Voshchanov, 
Rossiiskaia Gazeta, August 27, 1991, cited in the Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press.
16 “Yeltsin assailed by president of Kazakhstan ‘Chauvinist’ attitude of Russia decried,” Bal-
timore Sun, August 27, 1991, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-08-27/news/
1991239056_1_nazarbayev-yeltsin-kazakhstan.
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to heal the breach by sending a telegram to Yeltsin, in response to which 
Russian vice-President Alexander Rutskoy travelled immediately to Almaty. 
There, Rutskoy and Nazarbayev signed thirty agreements covering the econ-
omy, collective security, and the rights of citizens and territorial integrity. At 
a press conference afterwards, Rutskoy explained his boss’ earlier comments 
on borders as referring to the need for a general demarcation of inter-state 
borders on the basis of international norms.17
As soon as the dissolution of the Soviet Union became inevitable follow-
ing the Belovezh accords between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the Central 
Asian states were quick not just to join in but to influence the creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States which would replace the USSR. At 
meetings in Ashgabat and Almaty on December 13 and 14, alternative reso-
lutions were tabled by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but differences were 
only on technical details. All five Central Asian states insisted, successfully, 
that they would only join the CIS on the basis that they were considered as 
founder members, rather than as latecomers who were joining the original 
three Slavic states. They also referred to the CIS as a “Eurasian” union, a 
term that was not used at Belovezhskaya pushcha.18 Thus the Central Asian 
republics, while they continued to support the preservation of the Soviet Un-
ion until the last possible moment, also worked vigorously to shape its future 
and, once the dissolution had become inevitable, the future of the CIS. In 
particular, Nazarbayev’s condemnation of Yeltsin’s threat in August 1991 to 
revise state borders and his vigorous insistence on the principle of territorial 
integrity thereafter,19 ensured that the break-up of the USSR would, for the 
most part, be achieved without sparking damaging disputes over territory. 
Through this process, Nazarbayev and other Central Asian leaders were 
looking to get the best of both worlds. On the one hand, they wanted to 
achieve the sovereignty for their republic which would allow them to follow 
nation-building projects through to the end and escape the personal humilia-
tion encountered on being constantly reminded of their subordination to 
                                                          
17 Vladimir Desiatov, “Kazakhstan: Rutskogo v Alma-ate zhdali,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Au-
gust 31, 1991.
18 V. Ardaev, “Itogi Ashkhabadskoi vstrechi vyzvali vzdokh oblegcheniia: v strane i mire 
eshche odna nadezhda,” Izvestiia, December 14, 1991.
19 V. Kononenko, “Rukovoditeli pravitel’stv SNG obsuzhdaiut voprosy ekonomicheskogo 
razvitiia,” Izvestiia, December 24, 1991.
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Moscow;20 on the other hand, they would preserve the close economic inter-
action which was essential for their countries’ prosperity. As long as these 
two aims were achieved, the question of whether this should happen within 
the context of Gorbachev’s renewed Union or through multilateral and bilat-
eral arrangements between independent states was of no overriding im-
portance. It was not necessarily the choice of the Central Asian republics for 
the USSR to disappear, but once this became reality, they were ready to 
make the most of it. 
The two key aims of state sovereignty and economic union, while not 
exactly contradictory, led to tensions which were in evidence through the 
course of 1991 and 1992. Yeltsin’s ambivalent attitude to the integrity of 
existing borders in August 1991 has already been noted, and his insistence on 
Russia’s special place in the security structure of the CIS and its responsibil-
ity for Russians living outside the borders of the Russian Federation (see be-
low) also allowed for a flexible attitude to the new international borders. One 
implication of the hardening of republic borders into international borders 
had already been seen in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan in 1990: the more 
closed borders became, the more they were identified with a particular ethnic 
group, and the more politicized ethnic relations became. In and around Osh 
and other towns on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, ethnic violence in the summer 
of 1990 reflected, at least in part, fears over the implications of newly ac-
quired sovereignty for ethnic minorities.
While the revival of the Cossack movement and of Russian nationalism 
in general did lead to some unrest along Central Asia’s northern border with 
Russia, fears of similar bloodshed proved unfounded and this was not the 
main concern. Although Nazarbayev was committed to the belief that an 
open trade border with Russia was indispensable for Kazakhstan, he was al-
ready keenly aware of the dangers of being subject to an economic system 
over which he had no control. Before the break-up of the USSR, the 
RSFSR’s unilateral decisions on price rises or price liberalization led to 
goods flowing across the border from Kazakhstan and worsening shortages 
there. In response, Nazarbayev ordered the establishment of customs posts on 
the border for a short period in September 1991.
                                                          
20 See Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The 
Mind Aflame (London: Sage, 1997), 44–45.
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Although the principle of free trade was consistently agreed on by the 
CIS states, the temptation to follow protectionist policies proved hard to re-
sist. On January 16, 1992, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement On 
Removing Constraints in Economic Activity, which provided for the free 
movement of goods, services, labor and finance. Shortly afterwards, howev-
er, the Russian Federation set up customs points along the Kazakh border, 
leading to loud protests from Kazakhstan. When Kazakhstan in turn attempt-
ed to establish a customs regime with Russia in the summer of the same year, 
Russia responded by raising the price of energy exports to Kazakhstan until 
Nazarbayev backed down. 
The logic behind the sporadic strengthening of the border regimes be-
tween CIS states who were supposed to have signed up to the free passage of 
goods and peoples across borders was outlined by Yeltsin at a meeting of his 
government on June 4, 1992. The transportation across borders of stolen 
goods, most seriously of firearms, was showing a rapid increase and was set 
to keep growing, according to experts. As well as arms entering Russia, re-
ports from the Ministry of Culture of the disappearance of large numbers of 
icons and other cultural artifacts meant that traffic across the border was in 
need of control in both directions. Central Asian countries were picked out 
for having instituted visa-free agreements with non-CIS countries, which 
meant effectively that people could pass from the outside world to Russia 
and vice versa without any effective controls.21
The desire for free trade was in competition with a concept of interna-
tional borders which, in the Soviet experience, were always hard to cross. In 
addition, the security and inviolability of national borders were an important 
part of the legitimization of the new state and were closely linked to the idea 
of nations as they were conceived across the post-Soviet states. As a result of 
this symbolic nation-building role of borders as well as the difficulties al-
ready encountered with Russia and other neighbors in the course of 1992, the 
Law on Borders passed by the Parliament of Kazakhstan in December 1992 
and coming into force in 1993 was based on a very hard concept of borders. 
In discussions during the drafting of the law, the Border Guards’ Service 
went as far as insisting on a right to close the border altogether in case of the 
                                                          
21 Vasilii Kononenko, “Rossiia pristupaet k ukrepleniiu svoikh granits,” Izvestiia, June 4, 
1992.
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threat of disease epidemics or other emergencies.22 Such a provision was not 
included in the final law, but the border forces did have almost unlimited 
rights to use weapons. The preamble to the law made clear the importance of 
the border to the nation of Kazakhstan, and its tone had much more to do 
with the defense of a border that divided the country from others, than it had 
about the free transport of goods. The final version of the law went further
than previous drafts in establishing “border zones” at some distance from the 
border crossing points, which could be entered only by citizens with a special 
permit.23
Russia’s border regime underwent similar developments, and while in 
principle international agreements were (as stated in the Kazakh law) to take 
precedence over national law, the reality was that neither side was ready con-
sistently to abide by obligations, and the nature of the border swung first one 
way and then another. Things came to a head at the beginning of 1997, when 
Russia deployed Cossack units along the border with Kazakhstan, with the 
power to check documents and search the baggage of anyone crossing the 
border into Russia.24 This move led to a downturn in Russian-Kazakh rela-
tions that lasted over a year. 
Russia justified the move as necessary to curtail drug trafficking and 
smuggling. By the early 2000s such concerns had hardened, and in the im-
mediate aftermath of 9/11 international terrorism was added as an even more 
pressing reason to increase the security of the border. Not for the first time, 
growing concerns over security coincided with moves to further promote 
regional economic integration, which became increasingly focused on Rus-
sia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which were to go on to become the founder 
members of the Eurasian Customs Union, rather than the whole CIS. But that 
integration process was and still is hampered by the emergence by the begin-
ning of the millennium of two incompatible discourses: one emphasized free 
trade, local cross-border cooperation in services, and cultural exchange; 
while the other emphasized the need to control drugs, terrorists, contraband, 
illegal migrants, and arms.
                                                          
22 Natsional’nii arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (National Archive of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan––hereafter NARK), f.2, op.1, d.79, ll.142, 146.
23 NARK f.2, op.1, d.115, ll. 161–179.
24 Mikhail Alexandrov, Uneasy Alliance: Relations Between Russia and Kazakhstan in the 
Post-Soviet Era, 1992–1997 (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 141.
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Disputed Borders––the Caspian Sea
A different kind of border dispute emerged over the Caspian Sea. Here, as 
well as Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan and Iran were involved. Previously the sea had been governed by 
a 1921 treaty between Soviet Russia and Iran, and a 1940 treaty between the 
USSR and Iran. Iran and the Russian Federation now argued that the terms of 
this treaty still applied and should be adopted by the four new states which 
were successors to the Soviet Union and, as agreed at the end of 1991, which 
were bound by the Soviet Union’s international obligations. Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan argued, however, that the earlier treaties could no longer be 
deemed valid now that there were five littoral states instead of two, and that 
the Caspian should be governed according to international maritime law.
There were significant geopolitical and economic issues at stake. Firstly, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were keen to secure and develop the shipping 
route between Aktau and Baku, which could be used for oil and gas tankers 
to transport Kazakh and Turkmen energy resources through Azerbaijan and 
Georgia on to Europe without using Russian pipelines. But there was not 
much difference between the five states in terms of supporting the right of 
free navigation. The real issue which divided them was the exploitation of 
natural resources under the seabed. The significance of oil and gas deposits 
was becoming clear soon after the end of the Soviet Union, making the ques-
tion of rights and ownership a crucial one. Under the Russian-Iranian pro-
posals, the sea was treated as a common resource apart from a ten-mile fish-
ing zone, with joint control over the exploitation of oil and gas. By contrast 
applying maritime law would have divided most of the sea up into zones con-
trolled by each country according to the extent of their shorelines. The latter 
was clearly to Russia’s disadvantage as the heaviest concentration of re-
sources was in the more southern parts of the sea. It may also be that, while 
the geopolitics of energy were not as prominent in the early 1990s as in the 
2000s, Russian policymakers were aware of the significance of a possible 
energy transit route which bypassed Russia. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan’s legal case that the sea should come under 
international maritime law rested in part on an unconvincing argument that 
the Caspian was connected to the high seas through the Don-Volga river sys-
tem. On the other hand, the United States, in pursuit of its own interests and 
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anxious to limit Russian power, was supportive of the Azerbaijani-Kazakh 
position. Things seemed to swing decisively in the direction of Russia and 
Iran in 1996, however, when Turkmenistan lent them its full support.25
As Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan pressed ahead with tripartite agree-
ments on sharing resources in the sea, Kazakhstan, with the support of Azer-
baijan, continued to insist on a full new agreement, rejecting concessions 
offered by Russia to allow for each state to claim exclusive ownership over a 
45-mile strip along their coastlines. Nazarbayev’s persistence appeared to 
have paid off when, in July 1998, he reached an agreement with Yeltsin to 
divide the northern seabed between Kazakhstan and Russia.26 Russia did not 
stick by this commitment however, and today the status of the Caspian sea is 
hardly closer to being resolved than it was in 1994.
Security––from Common Space to National Defense
Russia was widely expected to play a major role in the security situation in 
Central Asia, generally because it seemed intent on maintaining its ties with 
its former peripheries, and specifically because of the abundance of military 
bases, including nuclear installations, in the region. A plethora of security-
related treaties and agreements were signed between Russia and the Central 
Asian states in the first half of the 1990s, but in reality financial pressures 
meant that Russia was unable to live up to many of its commitments and to 
implement the desired new security arrangements.27 But this is not to say that 
Russia did not engage in the security situation in Central Asia, especially as 
long as the civil war in Tajikistan was raging, or that security arrangements 
were not a source of contention between Russia and the Central Asian states. 
The assumption that Russia would take responsibility for the collective 
security of the whole of the former Soviet Union––or at least those parts of it 
that entered into the CIS––was embedded in the agreements that accompa-
nied the Soviet break-up. These were more than mere declarations as far as 
Central Asia was concerned, especially once the neo-Eurasianists in Yeltsin’s 
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entourage had taken control of most aspects of Russian foreign policy around 
the middle of 1992. This coincided with an escalation of hostilities in Tajiki-
stan and a more concerted effort on the part of Central Asia’s leaders to en-
sure Russia live up to its security commitments in the region. The result of 
these pressures was the signing of a Treaty on Collective Security by Ka-
zakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia in Tash-
kent on May 15, 1992. The treaty referred to the external borders of the CIS 
as common external borders, and therefore subject to defense by a CIS force 
which in practice came under Russian command. The dispatch of a further 
1200 CIS forces to the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan in July 
was one of the first consequences of this arrangement. The concern here was 
not with Tajikistan’s internal conflict but with the collapse of the regime in 
Afghanistan and the emergence of Taliban and other Islamist forces there. 
This did not, however, mean that Russian or Russian-led forces in the 
guise of CIS “blue helmets” were not a part of the military balance in the 
Tajik Civil War. Initially Russia’s involvement was promised jointly with 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, assuring support for the current 
Tajik leadership but urging responsibility.28 However, in November 1992, 
following the failure of Russia’s Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to secure 
the support of the Kulyab faction for a coalition government in Tajikistan, 
Russia threw its weight behind the government of Emomali Rakhmonov and 
sanctioned the use of the 201st Motorized Infantry Division (which had been 
stationed in Tajikistan since autumn 1945) “to keep order” and played an 
active military role from then on.29
A few days after these developments, Kozyrev provided some insights 
into his thinking on the role of Russia in the region in an interview with 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta: “Russia’s total withdrawal from Tajikistan would be 
detrimental to Russia’s national interests and a betrayal of our neighbours (I 
mean the Tajiks). We must also remember that Russians live there…Russia 
must act as a peacemaker. Russia’s current geopolitical interests in Central 
Asia do not involve a struggle for a sphere of influence. In order to protect 
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Russia’s borders, we must try to achieve political stability in the states of 
Central Asia.”30
Kozyrev and Yeltsin’s perception of Russia’s security role therefore had 
three elements: defense of the common external CIS border, internal security 
of each regime (with some option for backing one side or the other where 
there was more than one contender for leading the regime), and a special re-
sponsibility for the protection of the ethnic Russian population in the former 
Soviet republics. The all-encompassing nature of this role, and its links to 
Russia’s own national interests, was underlined by Yeltsin in a speech in 
February 1993: “Stopping all armed conflicts in the territory of the former 
USSR is Russia’s vital interest. The world community sees more and more 
clearly Russia’s special responsibility in this difficult undertaking…”31 What 
made this position controversial in the Central Asian context was that, while 
there was initially a general consensus over Russia’s special role in CIS secu-
rity, not all states agreed with Russia as to what that role should cover.
The single CIS army that had been promised as the key ingredient of a 
collective security strategy soon ran into objections from CIS members. 
Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan never signed up to the idea of a unified 
joint command of CIS forces, which was agreed by the remaining CIS states 
(Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and the Central Asian republics minus Turkmen-
istan) at the Minsk summit of December 30, 1991. But even at that early 
stage, the right of each member to form its own army was kept open, threat-
ening the whole idea of a single collective security arrangement. In the short 
term, however, individual states other than Russia were in no position to 
form such armies. Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev was the most ardent 
champion of a unified military. But even his support was tempered by Rus-
sia’s attitude. Yeltsin’s insistence in January 1992, shortly after Russia be-
came a separate state, that all military personnel swear a new oath of alle-
giance to the Russian Federation regardless of which republic they were sta-
tioned in, was immediately attacked by Nazarbayev, who preferred maintain-
ing the previous oath to the now defunct USSR. This dispute underlined the 
central problem with maintaining a unified military rather than separate na-
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tional armies. All of the post-Soviet states, Russia included, were actively 
engaged in a nation-building project in which, as we have already seen, terri-
tory and sovereignty played a major part.32 In spite of Nazarbayev’s enthusi-
asm, the notion that armed forces controlled by another country or group of 
countries should be stationed within the borders of a sovereign state never sat 
easily with such a project. For countries like Ukraine which were also dis-
trustful of Russian intentions, the objections were more than statements of a 
principle of sovereign statehood. For these reasons the project for a fully uni-
fied military command lasted only until April 4, 1992, when the Russian 
Federation announced it was creating its own national army, and within a 
month the Central Asian states had started to follow suit. 
One of the reasons for the failure of the early collective security ar-
rangements to stick was the perception of an arrogant attitude on the part of 
Russian military commanders. In July 1992, precisely as agreement was be-
ing reached between Russia and Turkmenistan over a joint command for 
Turkmenistan’s border troops, Russian officers raised objections to the re-
cruitment of Turkmen border guards to work alongside the Russian troops 
already in place, which this agreement entailed. Referring to the numerous 
tasks a border guard was expected to carry out Nikolai Reznichenko, the 
chief of the Border Defense Department of the Central Asian Border district, 
claimed “[t]he Turkmens, we have become convinced, are not yet capable of 
doing all these things…But when it comes to desertion and violating regula-
tions, they are masters.”33 Only weeks later, Turkmenistan declared it was 
setting up its own border guard without any agreement on joint command, 
and cited Yeltsin’s desire for greater control as the reason for withdrawing 
from joint arrangements.34 Similar feelings were expressed when Uzbekistan 
quit the Collective Security Treaty seven years later, claiming objections to 
“Russia’s military activities in certain CIS states” and blaming Russian 
heavy-handedness.35
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By the middle of the 1990s a gap had clearly opened up between Russia 
and the Central Asian states over their respective understandings of Russia’s 
role in the region. Differences went back at least to the end of 1991 when the 
leaders of the three Slavic republics met at Belovezhskaya Pushcha and de-
cided on the dissolution of the USSR. According to Nazarbayev, he was not 
invited to these talks although he was in Moscow at the time, and instead was 
asked afterwards to sign the agreement already made, something which he 
refused.36 Although the Central Asian leaders were able to succeed in achiev-
ing equal status with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in the founding documents 
of the CIS, they had little possibility of challenging the Russian assumption 
of responsibility for security arrangements and broad political influence in 
the region: Central Asia had no military units of its own, and while it could 
call on conscripts from each republic it lacked any trained officers and the 
financial means or infrastructure. The leaders of the new states also faced 
political uncertainty and challenges to their own position. What Russian poli-
ticians seem to have underestimated was the fact that by the middle of the 
decade, that uncertainty had receded. Each country now had a strong presi-
dent who was vigorously engaged in building up their land as a nation-state 
as well as reinforcing the legitimacy of their regimes and launching varying 
degrees of personality cult. Standing up to Russia, or at least not fawning to 
Moscow, was an important way of reaching each of these three ends. By 
1995 Kozyrev appears to have taken some, but not all, of this on board. Now 
he was talking about “gathering” the former Soviet republics together using
Russia’s military influence, which had been exercised in resolving Tajiki-
stan’s civil war and could now be consolidated through the establishment of 
military bases throughout Central Asia.37 But by mid-1999 Russian plans for 
a new, permanent, military base in Tajikistan had been dropped, and even 
Russian border guards had been ejected from one country after another, apart 
from Tajikistan where they remained continuously up until 2005. As border 
guards departed Kyrgyzstan in May 1999, they were pursued by hostile 
crowds hurling abuse.38
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As well as losing its military presence and vision of Russian-led collec-
tive security, between 1993 and 1995 Russia witnessed each of the Central 
Asian countries withdrawing from the ruble zone and introducing their own 
currencies. This was linked, in the eyes of Russian nationalists in particular 
but also in concerns raised by Kozyrev, to the apparent deterioration in the 
situation of ethnic Russians in Central Asia (see next section).39 Turkmeni-
stan continued to be closely tied to Russia and was the only country to reach 
an agreement on dual citizenship, largely because of its dependence on Rus-
sia’s gas pipelines for its own exports; but even here there were differences 
over the nature of the energy relationship.40 Nazarbayev repeatedly raised his 
vision of a Eurasian Union and in 1995 was even ready to return to the idea 
of joint military forces,41 but the clear trend by the middle of the decade was 
for the Central Asian states to march to their own tune, much to the disap-
pointment of Russian politicians and nationalists. From 1995 onwards high 
level contacts continued on a regular basis, but agreements tended to be re-
stricted to trade and energy matters.
A renewed security role for Russia in the region was back on the cards as 
a result of events in the second half of 1999. Terror attacks in Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan, blamed on Islamic extremist Wahhabis, were linked by Rus-
sia’s new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to his own renewed war on Chechen 
terrorism. Putin promised support to Kyrgyzstan, received a standing ovation 
from Tajikistan’s Parliament on a state visit there, and signed a new security 
agreement with Uzbekistan only ten months after Karimov had denounced 
Russia’s military role. Putin declared that “Russia does not intend to declare 
any of the CIS countries to be zones of Russian strategic interests, for that 
would be inconsistent with our political tradition.” Instead, he proposed a 
series of bilateral “strategic partnerships.”42 Global events had conspired to 
allow Russia to replace its stance of unquestioning military dominance in the 
region with a more equal relationship based on a campaign which was soon 
to embrace the Western world as well––the International War on Terror.
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Ethnic Russians
In addition to the border issues discussed above, the large numbers of Rus-
sians now living outside of the borders of the Russian Federation after the 
break-up of the USSR constituted an important element in Russia’s foreign 
policy. Russia’s self-proclaimed right to protect ethnic Russians beyond its 
borders played some role in Russia’s engagement in Tajikistan, where Rus-
sians made up 7.6 percent of the population in 1989.43 As already noted 
above, in November 1992, Kozyrev justified Russian intervention in Tajiki-
stan in part on the fact that “[w]e must also remember that Russians live 
there…Russia must act as a peacemaker.”44 Otherwise, the plight of ethnic 
Russians did not lead to any military or other direct cross-border activities in 
the 1990s. The Russian authorities did, however, use two other tools more 
regularly. One was to put direct pressure on governments to ensure the rights 
of Russians. These could be linked to international agreements or other forms 
of cooperation from Russia. Even before the end of the Soviet Union, in July 
1991 a treaty signed between the RSFSR and Kyrgyzstan linked a loan of 
800 million rubles to a guarantee of the rights of the populations of each oth-
er’s republics.45 In 1995, economic agreements made between Yeltsin and 
Niyazov were also linked to the protection of Russians in Turkmenistan.46
The second tool was to provide direct material, financial and political back-
ing to Russian organizations in the former Soviet states. In the first post-
Soviet years, such efforts were focused especially on Cossack groups in 
Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan. In 1993–1994, the status of Cossack or-
ganizations became a source of some tension between Moscow and Almaty, 
as Cossacks in northern Kazakhstan declared their own regional self-rule and 
the Russian Ministry of Justice registered a “Siberian Cossack Force” which 
had four of its sixteen subdivisions in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh authorities 
responded by refusing to register any Cossack organizations until a compro-
mise was reached whereby some Cossack organizations were registered with 
the proviso that they were not military formations.47
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Russia also sought to extend the concept of citizenship on an ethnic basis 
to Russians abroad. A June 1993 amendment to the citizenship law allowed 
qualified people to obtain Russian citizenship even if such individuals had 
already acquired citizenship in another country. The right to dual citizenship 
was enshrined in Yeltsin’s constitution that was brought in later the same 
year. This dual citizenship was at odds with practices elsewhere in the former 
Soviet Union (and in the Russian Federation before June 1993), and raised 
fears that substantial portions of the population in countries like Kazakhstan 
would be encouraged to develop their identification with the Russian state at 
the expense of the nation-building and state-building projects of Kazakhstan. 
Despite strong pressure from Russia to sign bilateral treaties on dual citizen-
ship, Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian state that Russia was able to 
prevail on.48 Even in that case, Turkmenistan repealed its agreement in 2003. 
The Central Asian states were equally cool about a Russian proposal in 1994 
to create a common citizenship for CIS members.49
Rhetoric about the plight of Russians in Central Asia surfaced in the 
Russian press in response to new language laws and perceived discrimination 
against Russians. Concerns were highest in relation to Kazakhstan, where 
almost 4.5 million ethnic Russians remained by 1999 (down from 6.2 million 
in 1989). The language laws of 1989 and 1995, which relegated the Russian 
language to second place behind Kazakh while remaining an official lan-
guage, were a constant source of protest. The move of the capital of Kazakh-
stan from Almaty to Astana (formerly Akmola), on the edge of the predomi-
nantly Russian regions of northern Kazakhstan, in 1997 was widely inter-
preted in Russia as a move designed to keep an eye on those regions.50 Press 
reports complained regularly of the rewriting of history in Kazakhstan to por-
tray negative aspects of Imperial Russian rule, and linked this to discrimina-
tion against Russians.51 In November 1993, in the wake of the collapse of the 
ruble zone, Kozyrev toured the Central Asian states with the main aim of 
highlighting the plight of ethnic Russians.52 While official concerns about 
ethnic Russians generally became more muted after the mid-1990s, the issue 
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remained a popular one for Russian nationalists as well as Russian and Cos-
sack groups within the region. 
Conclusion
The suddenness of the dissolution of the USSR left little time for the prepara-
tion of concrete visions of the post-Soviet order. The perception that it was 
Yeltsin and Russia that had brought about the end of communism and that 
the Central Asian states were late arrivers in the process reinforced the as-
sumption that they would continue to operate firmly within Russia’s orbit. 
But this assumption underestimated the readiness of Central Asian leaders to 
push forward with their own state building, and the collapse of Russia’s 
economy propelled them to look in different directions for their economic 
relations––to China, South Asia and the European Union.
Central Asian governments, each at its own pace, were able to remove 
themselves from the Russian orbit without fear of serious consequences. In 
the mid-1990s, Russia was embroiled in the Chechen War, was struggling to 
overcome its economic difficulties and the consequences of the 1993 politi-
cal crisis, and was at odds with the West over NATO expansion, Kosovo, 
and the pace of economic and democratic reform. Russia’s deficit of power 
provided the opportunity, and a number of factors provided the incentive. In 
addition to geopolitical and economic realities, each of the Central Asian 
leaders had now embarked on a strategy of state and nation-building centered 
on the cult of the President, and standing up to Russia and promoting the na-
tional language and culture were central to that strategy.
By 1995, the reality that, in relation to Central Asia, the Soviet Union re-
ally had come to an end finally hit home, to a chorus of bitter recriminations. 
The influential Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Vla-
dimir Lukin, noted “[b]eyond Kazakhstan, nothing is clear…this creates a 
completely unprotected country. Completely unmonitored with respect to 
narcotics, arms dealing, and all kinds of gangsterism generally. This is very 
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dangerous.”53 In a similar vein, two correspondents for Moskovskie Novosti
complained “[i]t is not hard to see that Russia’s influence in the Central 
Asian region has been steadily declining from year to year. Pushed out of the 
ruble zone and fenced in by customs posts and new borders, post-Soviet Asia 
is turning southward.”54 The malaise caused by the loss of Empire clearly 
kicked in at this time and, combined with the reverses of the Chechen con-
flict, served to undermine Yeltsin’s popularity. It took the new shared dis-
course of the International War on Terror and a new leader, Vladimir Putin, 
to revive Russia’s presence in the region as the new millennium dawned. 
Putin’s War on International Terrorism in Chechnya became almost immedi-
ately an International War on Terrorism as the field of operations spread to 
Central Asia. From this position, Putin was able to respond to the attacks on 
New York and Washington of 9/11/2001 more rapidly and more confidently 
than any other European leader. For at least a while, he acted the part of in-
ternational statesman to great effect. Reasserting some kind of Russian pre-
dominance in Central Asia was an important part of this, since it was Putin’s 
readiness to approve the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia to sup-
port the new war in Afghanistan that made a genuine global coalition possi-
ble. This was not, however, an easy path for Russia, and the drift of the Cen-
tral Asian states away from the Russian orbit in the course of the 1990s was 
never fully reversed.           
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